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This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the tax and transfer systems in the European Union 
and the US to act as an automatic stabilizer in the current economic crisis. We find that 
automatic stabilizers absorb 38 per cent of a proportional income shock in the EU, compared 
to 32 per cent in the US. In the case of an unemployment shock 48 per cent of the shock are 
absorbed in the EU, compared to 34 per cent in the US. This cushioning of disposable 
income leads to a demand stabilization of 23 to 32 per cent in the EU and 19 per cent in the 
US. There is large heterogeneity within the EU. Automatic stabilizers in Eastern and 
Southern Europe are much lower than in Central and Northern European countries. We also 
investigate whether countries with weak automatic stabilizers have enacted larger fiscal 
stimulus programs. We find no evidence supporting this view. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  E32, E63, H2, H31 
  





Andreas Peichl  
IZA 




                                                 
* This paper uses EUROMOD version D21 and TAXSIM v9. EUROMOD and TAXSIM are continually 
being improved and updated and the results presented here represent the best available at the time of 
writing. Our version of TAXSIM is based on the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) by the Federal 
Reserve Board. EUROMOD relies on micro-data from 17 different sources for 19 countries. These are 
the ECHP and EU-SILC by Eurostat, the Austrian version of the ECHP by Statistik Austria; the PSBH 
by the University of Liège and the University of Antwerp; the Estonian HBS by Statistics Estonia; the 
Income Distribution Survey by Statistics Finland; the EBF by INSEE; the GSOEP by DIW Berlin; the 
Greek HBS by the National Statistical Service of Greece; the Living in Ireland Survey by the Economic 
and Social Research Institute; the SHIW by the Bank of Italy; the PSELL-2 by CEPS/INSTEAD; the 
SEP by Statistics Netherlands; the Polish HBS by Warsaw University; the Slovenian HBS and 
Personal Income Tax database by the Statistical Office of Slovenia; the Income Distribution Survey by 
Statistics Sweden; and the FES by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) through the Data 
Archive. Material from the FES is Crown Copyright and is used by permission. Neither the ONS nor 
the Data Archive bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. 
An equivalent disclaimer applies for all other data sources and their respective providers. 
This paper is partly based on work carried out during Andreas Peichl’s visit to the European Centre for 
Analysis in the Social Sciences (ECASS) at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), 
University of Essex, supported by the Access to Research Infrastructures action under the EU 
Improving Human Potential Programme. We would like to thank David Blanchflower and seminar 
participants in Bonn, Cologne and Siegen for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to 
Daniel Feenberg for granting us access to TAXSIM and helping us with our simulations. We are 
indebted to all past and current members of the EUROMOD consortium for the construction and 
development of EUROMOD. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
In the current economic crisis, ￿scal policy is widely seen to play a key role in stabi-
lizing demand and output. A large part of the debate on the ￿scal policy response
to the crisis has focused on discretionary ￿scal policy action in the form of ￿scal
stimulus packages. But there is a second source of ￿scal expansion in an economic
crisis: the workings of automatic stabilizers. Automatic stabilizers are usually de-
￿ned as those elements of ￿scal policy which mitigate output ￿ uctuations without
discretionary government action (see e.g. Eaton and Rosen (1980) or Auerbach and
Feenberg (2000)). Some observers have argued that automatic stabilizers may pro-
vide a contribution to demand stabilization which is as important as active ￿scal
policy measures. For example, J￿rgen Stark, member of the European Central Bank
directorate, recently claimed that "automatic stabilization accounts for 50% of the
￿scal stimulus in Germany over the next 2 years."1
It is the purpose of this paper to assess the contribution of automatic stabilizers
to overall ￿scal expansion and demand stabilization and to compare automatic ￿scal
stabilizers in Europe and the US. The extent to which automatic stabilizers miti-
gate the impact of income shocks on household demand essentially depends on two
factors. Firstly, the tax and transfer system determines the way in which a given
shock to gross income translates into a change in disposable income. For instance,
in the presence of a proportional income tax with a tax rate of 40 per cent, a shock
on gross income of one hundred Euros leads to a decline in disposable income of 60
Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs 40 per cent of the shock to gross income. A
progressive tax, in turn, would have a stronger stabilizing e⁄ect. The second factor
is the link between current disposable income and current demand for goods and
services. If the income shock is perceived as transitory and current demand depends
on some concept of permanent income, and if households can borrow, their demand
will not change. In this case, the impact of automatic stabilizers on current demand
would be equal to zero. Things are di⁄erent, though, if households are liquidity con-
strained. In this case, their current expenditures do depend on disposable income
so that automatic stabilizers play a role.
We analyze the impact of automatic stabilizers using microsimulation models
for 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM).2 In our baseline
1This statement was made in an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on May 20th
2009.
2The simulation approach allows us to investigate the causal e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of shocks
1simulation, we only take into account personal income taxes (at all government
levels), social insurance contributions as well as payroll taxes paid by employees,
and transfers to private households like, e.g., unemployment bene￿ts.3 We consider
the tax bene￿t rules which were in force before the start of the crisis (01.01.2008).
As a measure of automatic stabilization, we use the normalized tax change as in
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000). This indicator relates the shock absorption by the
tax and transfer system to the overall size of the income shock. In the example
given above, the normalized tax change would be equal to 0.4, which means that
the automatic stabilizers of the tax and transfer system would absorb 40 per cent
of the shock to gross income.
We run several controlled experiments of macro shocks to income and employ-
ment. We focus on two types of shocks. The ￿rst is a proportional decline in
household gross income by ￿ve per cent (income shock). This is the usual way
of modeling shocks in simulation studies analyzing automatic stabilizers. But eco-
nomic downturns typically a⁄ect households asymmetrically, with some households
losing their jobs and su⁄ering a sharp decline in income and other households be-
ing much less a⁄ected, as wages are usually rigid in the short term. We therefore
consider a second macro shock where some households become unemployed, so that
the unemployment rate increases by ￿ve percentage points (unemployment shock).
After identifying the e⁄ects of these shocks on disposable income, we use methods
developed by Zeldes (1989) to estimate the prevalence of credit constraints among
households. On this basis, we calculate how the stabilization of disposable income
translates into demand stabilization.
Our analysis leads to the following main results. In the case of an income shock,
approximately 38 per cent of the shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers
in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd a value of 32 per cent. This is surprising because
automatic stabilizers in Europe are usually perceived to be drastically higher than in
the US. Our results qualify this view to some extent, at least as far as proportional
shocks on household income are concerned. Within the EU, there is considerable
heterogeneity, and results range from a value of 25 per cent for Estonia to 59 per cent
for Denmark. In general automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European
on household disposable income, holding everything else constant and therefore avoiding endogene-
ity problems (see Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)).
3We abstract from other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes. For an analysis of auto-
matic stabilizers in the corporate tax system see Devereux and Fuest (forthcoming) and Buettner
and Fuest (2009).
2countries are considerably lower than in Continental and Northern European coun-
tries. In the case of the unemployment shock, the di⁄erence between the EU and
the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers absorb 48 per cent of the shock whereas
the stabilization e⁄ect in the US is only 34 per cent. Again, there is considerable
heterogeneity within the EU.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? Since
demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households, the
picture changes signi￿cantly. For the income shock, the cushioning e⁄ect of au-
tomatic stabilizers is now equal to 23 per cent in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd a
value of 19 per cent, which is again rather similar. For the unemployment shock,
however, we ￿nd a large di⁄erence. In the EU, the stabilization e⁄ect is equal to 32
per cent whereas the value for the US (19 per cent) is similar to the value for the
income shock. These results suggest that social transfers, in particular the rather
generous systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for demand
stabilization and explain an important part of the di⁄erence in automatic stabilizers
between Europe and the US.
In the empirical literature on automatic stabilizers, two types of studies prevail:
macro (time series) studies and micro data estimates.4 Sachs and Sala-i Martin
(1992) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995) use time series data and ￿nd values of
30-40% for disposable income stabilization in the US. Other studies focus on the re-
lationship between output volatility, public sector size and openness of the economy
(Cameron (1978), Gal￿ (1994), Rodrik (1998), van den Noord (2000), Auerbach and
Hassett (2002)). On the micro data side, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) use the
NBER￿ s microsimulation model TAXSIM to estimate the automatic stabilization
for the US from 1962-95 and ￿nd values for the stabilization of disposable income
ranging between 25 and 35%. Auerbach (2009) has updated this analysis and ￿nds
a value around 25% for more recent years. Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) conduct
a similar analysis for 15 European countries in 1998 and ￿nd higher stabilization
e⁄ects than in the US, with results ranging from 32-58%.5 How does this smoothing
4Early estimates on the responsiveness of the tax system to income ￿ uctuations are discussed
in the Appendix of Goode (1976). More recent contributions include Fat￿s and Mihov (2001),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), MØlitz and Zumer (2002).
5Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) rely for their analysis (which is a more recent version of Mabbett
(2004)) on the results from an in￿ ation scenario taken from Immvervoll et al. (2006) who use the
microsimulation model EUROMOD to increase earnings by 10% in order to simulate the sensitivity
of poverty indicators with respect to macro level changes.
3of disposable income a⁄ect household demand? To the best of our knowledge, Auer-
bach and Feenberg (2000) is the only simulation study which tries to estimate the
demand e⁄ect taking into account liquidity constraints. They also use the method
suggested by Zeldes (1989) and ￿nd that approximately two thirds of all households
are likely to be liquidity constrained. Given this, the contribution of automatic sta-
bilizers to demand smoothing is reduced to approximately 15 per cent of the initial
income shock.
What does the present paper contribute to this literature? Firstly, previous
studies have focused on proportional income shocks whereas our analysis shows that
automatic stabilizers work very di⁄erently in the case of unemployment shocks,
which a⁄ect households asymmetrically.6 Secondly, to the best of our knowledge,
our study is the ￿rst to estimate the prevalence of liquidity constraints for EU
household data.7 This is of key importance for assessing the role of automatic
stabilizers for demand smoothing. Thirdly, our analysis includes a decomposition
of the overall stabilization e⁄ects into the contributions of taxes, social insurance
contributions and bene￿ts. We show that this decomposition is important for the
comparison between the U.S. and Europe. Finally, a di⁄erence between our study
and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) as well as Auerbach (2009) is that we take into
account unemployment bene￿ts and state level income taxes. This explains why our
estimates of automatic stabilization e⁄ects in the US are higher.
A ￿nal issue we discuss in the paper is how ￿scal stimulus programs of individual
countries are related to automatic stabilizers. In particular, we ask whether countries
with low automatic stabilizers have tried to compensate this by larger ￿scal stimuli.
But we ￿nd no correlation between the size of ￿scal stimulus programs and automatic
stabilizers.
The setup of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the microsim-
ulation models EUROMOD and TAXSIM. In addition, we discuss how stabilization
e⁄ects can be measured and describe the di⁄erent macro shock scenarios we con-
sider. Section 3 presents the results on automatic stabilization which are discussed
in Section 4 together with potential limitations of our approach. Section 5 concludes.
6Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) do consider a shock where households at di⁄erent income
levels are a⁄ected di⁄erently, but the results are very similar to the case of a symmetric shock.
Our analysis con￿rms this for the US, but not for Europe.
7There are several studies on liquidity constraints and the responsiveness of households to tax
changes in for the US (see, e.g., Zeldes (1989), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Johnson et al. (2006),
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009))
42 Data and methodology
2.1 Microsimulation using TAXSIM and EUROMOD
We use microsimulation techniques to simulate taxes, bene￿ts and disposable in-
come under di⁄erent scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households.
Simulation analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing the pa-
rameters of interest while holding everything else constant (cf. Bourguignon and
Spadaro (2006)). We therefore do not have to deal with endogeneity problems when
identifying the e⁄ects of the policy reform under consideration.
Simulations are carried out using TAXSIM - the NBER￿ s microsimulation model
for calculating liabilities under US Federal and State income tax laws from individual
data8- and EUROMOD, a static tax-bene￿t model for 19 EU countries, which was
designed for comparative analysis.9 The models can simulate most direct taxes and
bene￿ts except those based on previous contributions as this information is usually
not available from the cross-sectional survey data used as input datasets. Informa-
tion on these instruments is taken directly from the original data sources. Both
models assume full bene￿t take-up and tax compliance, focusing on the intended
e⁄ects of tax-bene￿t systems. The main stages of the simulations are the following.
First, a micro-data sample and tax-bene￿t rules are read into the model. Then for
each tax and bene￿t instrument, the model constructs corresponding assessment
units, ascertains which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount
of bene￿t or tax liability for each member of the unit. Finally, after all taxes and
bene￿ts in question are simulated, disposable income is calculated.
2.2 Income de￿nitions
In the context of this analysis, we use the following income concepts. Market income
YM is de￿ned as the sum of all incomes from market activities:
8For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/.
9For further information on EUROMOD, see Sutherland (2001, 2007). There are also country
reports available with detailed information on the input data, the modeling and validation of each
tax bene￿t system, see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. The tax-bene￿t systems
included in the model have been validated against aggregated administrative statistics as well
as national tax-bene￿t models (where available), and the robustness checked through numerous
applications (see, e.g., Bargain (2006)).
5YM = E + Q + I + P + O (1)
where E is earnings, Q business income, I capital income, P property income, and
O other income. Disposable income YD is de￿ned as market income minus net
government intervention G = T + S ￿ B :
YD = YM ￿ G = YM ￿ (T + S ￿ B) (2)
where T are direct taxes, S social insurance contributions, and B are social cash
bene￿ts (i.e. negative taxes).
2.3 Measurement of automatic stabilization
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization is the "normalized tax
change" used by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be interpreted as "the
tax system￿ s built-in ￿ exibility" (Pechman (1973, 1987)). It shows how changes in
market income translate into changes in disposable income. In the following we
simply refer to this measure as the income stabilization coe¢ cient, denoted by ￿.
We derive ￿ from a general functional relationship between disposable income and
market income:
￿ = ￿(YM;T;S;B): (3)
The income stabilization coe¢ cient ￿ can be computed using arithmetic changes
(￿) in disposable income (￿YD) and market income (￿YM) :
￿YD = (1 ￿ ￿)￿YM










￿T + ￿S ￿ ￿B
￿YM
(4)
It measures the sensitivity of disposable income, YD; with respect to market
income, YM. The higher ￿, the stronger the stabilization e⁄ect, e.g. ￿ = 0:4 implies
that 40% of the income shock is absorbed by the tax bene￿t system. Note that
the income stabilization coe¢ cient is not only determined by the size of government
(e.g. measured as expenditure or revenue in percent of GDP) but also depends on
the structure of the tax bene￿t system and the design of the di⁄erent components.
Furthermore, it is important to explore the extent to which di⁄erent individual
6components of the tax transfer system contribute to stabilization. Comparing tax
bene￿t systems in Europe and the US, we are interested in the weight of each
component in the respective country. We therefore decompose the coe¢ cient into














However, in order to stabilize ￿nal demand and output, the cushioning e⁄ect on
disposable income has to be transmitted to expenditures for goods and services. If
current demand depends on some concept of permanent income, demand will not
change in response to a transitory income shock. Things are di⁄erent, though, if
households are liquidity constrained and cannot borrow. In this case, their cur-
rent expenditures do depend on disposable income so that automatic stabilizers
play a role. Following Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), we assume that households
who face liquidity constraints adjust consumption expenditure after changes in dis-
posable income while no such behavior occurs among households without liquidity
constraints.10 The adjustment of liquidity constrained households takes place such
that changes in disposable income are equal to changes in consumption. Hence, the






where ￿CLQ denotes the consumption response of liquidity constrained house-
holds. In the following, we refer to ￿C as the demand stabilization coe¢ cient. In
order to explore the sensitivity of our estimates of the demand stabilization coe¢ -
cient with respect to the way in which liquidity constrained households are identi￿ed,
we choose two di⁄erent approaches. In the ￿rst one, we use the same approach as
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and follow Zeldes (1989) to split the samples accord-
ing to a speci￿c wealth to income ratio. A household is liquidity constrained if its









10Note that the term "liquidity constraint" does not have to be interpreted in an absolute
inability to borrow but can also come in a milder form of a substantial di⁄erence between borrowing
and lending rates which can result in distortions of the timing of purchases.
7The second approach simply considers the bottom 75% of the gross income dis-
tribution to be liquidity constrained.
2.4 Scenarios
The existing literature on stabilization so far has concentrated on increases in earn-
ings or gross incomes to examine the stabilizing impact of tax bene￿t systems. In
the light of the current economic crisis, there is much more interest in a downturn
scenario. Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) stress that recessions which follow a ￿nancial
crisis have particularly severe e⁄ects on asset prices, output and unemployment.
Therefore, we are interested not only in a scenario of an uniform decrease in in-
comes but also in an increase of the unemployment rate. We compare a scenario
where gross incomes are decreased by 5% (income shock) to a scenario where the
unemployment rate increases by 5 percentage points (unemployment shock).11
The increase of the unemployment rate is modeled through reweighting of our
samples.12 The weights of the unemployed are increased while those of the employed
with similar characteristics are decreased, i.e., in e⁄ect, a fraction of employed house-
holds is made unemployed. With this reweighting approach we control for several
individual and household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unem-
ployed (see Appendix A.2). The implicit assumption behind this approach is that
the socio-demographic characteristics of the unemployed remain constant.13
11Our scenarios can be seen as a conservative estimate of the expected impact of the current
crisis (see Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) for previous crises). One should note, however, that our
analysis is not a forecasting exercise. We do not aim at quantifying the exact e⁄ects of the current
economic crisis but of stylized scenarios in order to explore the build-in automatic stabilizers of
existing pre-crisis tax-bene￿t systems. Conducting an ex-post analysis would include discretionary
government reactions and behavioral responses (see, e.g., Aaberge et al. (2000) for an empirical
ex-post analysis of a previous crisis in the Nordic countries) and we would not be able to identify
the role of automatic stabilization.
12For the reweigthing procedure, we follow the approach of Immvervoll et al. (2006), who have
also simulated an increase in unemployment through reweighting of the sample. Their analysis
focuses on changes in absolute and relative poverty rates after changes in the income distribution
and the employment rate.
13Cf. Deville and S￿rndal (1992). This approach is equivalent to estimating probabilities of
becoming unemployed (see, e.g., Bell and Blanch￿ ower (2009)) and then selecting the individuals
with the highest probabilities when controlling for the same characteristics in the reweighting
estimation (see Herault (2009)).
83 Results
3.1 US vs. Europe
We start our analysis by comparing the US to Europe. Our simulation model in-
cludes 19 European countries which we treat as one single country (i.e. the ￿United
States of Europe￿ ). All of them are EU member states, which is why we refer to this
group as the EU, bearing in mind that some EU member countries are missing. We
also consider the countries of the Euro area and refer to this group as ￿ Euro￿ . Figure
1 summarizes the results of our baseline simulation, which focuses on the income
tax, social insurance contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by employees and bene￿ts.
Consider ￿rst the income shock. Approximately 38 per cent of such a shock would
be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU (and Euroland). For the US, we ￿nd
a slightly lower value of 32 per cent. This di⁄erence of just six percentage points is
surprising in so far as automatic stabilizers in Europe are usually considered to be
drastically higher than in the US.14 Our results qualify this view to a certain degree,
at least as far as proportional income shocks are concerned. Figure 1 shows that
taxes and social insurance contributions are the dominating factors which drive ￿ in
case of a uniform income shock. Bene￿ts are of minor importance in this scenario.
In the case of the unemployment shock, the di⁄erence between the EU and the
US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers now absorb 48 per cent of the shock (in
the Euro zone, we are close to 50 per cent) whereas the stabilization e⁄ect in the
US is only 34 per cent. This di⁄erence can be explained with the importance of
unemployment bene￿ts which account for a large part of stabilization in Europe in
this scenario. Table 3 in the Appendix shows that bene￿ts alone absorb 21 per cent
of the shock in Europe compared to just 7 per cent in the US.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? The re-
sults for stabilization of aggregate demand are shown in Figure 2. The demand stabi-
lization coe¢ cients are lower than the income stabilization coe¢ cients since demand
stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households. Therefore,
the picture changes signi￿cantly. For the EU, the cushioning e⁄ect of automatic
stabilizers is now equal to 23 per cent. For the US, we ￿nd a value of 19 per cent,
which is again similar. For the Euro area, where fewer households are identi￿ed to
14Note that for the US the value of the stabilization coe¢ cient for the federal income tax only
is below 25% which is in line with the results of Auerbach and Feenberg (2000).
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
be credit constrained, the demand stabilization coe¢ cient (20 per cent) is almost as
low as in the US. For the unemployment shock, the picture again changes completely.
In the EU, the stabilization e⁄ect is equal to 32 per cent, the Euro area is slightly
lower (30 per cent), whereas the value for the US (19 per cent) is close to the value
for the income shock. These results suggest that the transfers to the unemployed, in
particular the rather generous systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play
a key role for demand stabilization and drive the di⁄erence in automatic stabilizers
between Europe and the US.
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
3.2 Country decomposition
The results for the stabilization coe¢ cient vary considerably across countries, as
can be seen from Figure 3 (and Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix). In the case of
the income shock, we ￿nd the highest stabilization coe¢ cient for Denmark, where
automatic stabilizers cushion 56 per cent of the shock. Belgium (53 per cent),
Germany (48 per cent) and, surprisingly, Hungary (48 per cent) also have strong
automatic stabilizers. The lowest values are found for Estonia (25 per cent), Spain
(28 per cent) and Greece (29 per cent). With the exception of France, taxes seem to
have a stronger stabilizing role than social security contributions. The picture again
changes substantially in the case of the unemployment shock. Again, the highest
value emerges for Denmark (71 per cent), followed by Sweden (69 per cent), Austria
(67 per cent) Belgium (66 per cent) and Germany (65 per cent). The relatively
low value of stabilization from (unemployment) bene￿ts in Finland compared to its
11neighboring Nordic countries might be surprising at a ￿rst glance but but can be
explained with the fact that Finland has the least generous unemployment bene￿ts
of the Nordic countries (see Aaberge et al. (2000)). Hungary (46 per cent) is now
below the EU average (48 per cent) due to the very low level of unemployment
bene￿ts. At the other end of the spectrum, there are some countries with values
far below the US level of 39 per cent. These include Estonia (16 per cent), Spain
(28 per cent), Poland (30 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, Italy (36 per cent). The
negative stabilization coe¢ cient for bene￿ts in Estonia and Poland can be explained
with the fact that the majority of bene￿ts is conditional on working.




































































































Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
How does this stabilization of disposable incomes a⁄ect household demand? In
most Eastern European countries, households are more likely to be credit constrained
than in Western Europe because ￿nancial wealth is typically lower. Our estimates
con￿rm this. For this reason automatic stabilizers will be more important for de-
12mand stabilization in these countries. This explains why we ￿nd the highest modi￿ed
demand stabilization coe¢ cient for Hungary (46 per cent) and why we ￿nd a sta-
bilization e⁄ect which is above the EU average even for Poland (30 per cent) and
Estonia (25 per cent), although disposable income stabilization is below the EU
average in these countries. Relatively low values for automatic stabilization e⁄ects
of the tax and transfer systems on demand are now found in countries where house-
holds are relatively wealthy, so that credit constraints are less important. These
include Sweden, with a stabilization coe¢ cient of 26 per cent, Germany (25 per
cent) and in particular France (16 per cent) and Italy (6 per cent). Our results,
including those for other individual EU countries, are summarized in Table 1.15
15The results are robust to other de￿nitions of liquidity constraints (see Appendix Table 4).
13Table 1: Stabilization of aggregate demand
Share liquidity constrained Income shock Unemployment shock
Population Income ￿ Demand ￿ Income ￿ Demand ￿ Income
AT 0.891 0.883 0.388 0.439 0.606 0.670
BE 0.706 0.639 0.348 0.527 0.466 0.657
DK 0.619 0.576 0.320 0.558 0.470 0.707
EE 0.984 0.969 0.246 0.253 0.162 0.168
FI 0.741 0.629 0.266 0.396 0.385 0.541
FR 0.479 0.420 0.161 0.370 0.341 0.582
GE 0.511 0.503 0.248 0.481 0.376 0.645
GR 0.854 0.822 0.234 0.291 0.310 0.383
HU 0.976 0.961 0.457 0.476 0.452 0.464
IR 0.736 0.646 0.228 0.363 0.315 0.425
IT 0.189 0.151 0.060 0.346 0.054 0.359
LU 0.773 0.768 0.284 0.374 0.419 0.533
NL 0.706 0.657 0.264 0.397 0.348 0.472
PL 0.985 0.982 0.296 0.301 0.288 0.295
PT 0.899 0.886 0.273 0.303 0.589 0.625
SI 0.743 0.632 0.112 0.317 0.245 0.425
SP 0.837 0.824 0.225 0.277 0.230 0.283
SW 0.630 0.599 0.257 0.420 0.501 0.685
UK 0.824 0.775 0.277 0.352 0.397 0.441
EU 0.640 0.608 0.228 0.378 0.321 0.482
EURO 0.549 0.516 0.200 0.385 0.299 0.504
USA 0.777 0.536 0.194 0.322 0.189 0.337
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
Note: A household is de￿ned as liquidity constrained if its capitalized wealth is less than
the disposable income of at least two months (cf. Zeldes (1989)).
4 Discussion of the results
In this section, we discuss a number of possible objections to and questions raised
by our analysis. These include the relation of our results to widely used macro
indicators of automatic stabilizers, the role of other taxes, the correlation between
automatic stabilizers and other macro variables like e.g. openness and, ￿nally, the
correlation between automatic stabilizers and discretionary ￿scal stimulus programs.
144.1 Stabilization Coe¢ cients and Simple Macro Indicators
One could argue that aggregate measures like e.g. the tax revenue to GDP ratio
reveal su¢ cient information on the magnitude of automatic stabilizers in the dif-
ferent countries. For instance, the IMF (2009) has recently used aggregate tax to
GDP ratios as proxies for the size of automatic stabilizers in G-20 countries. Figure
4 depicts the relation between the ratio of average revenue 2006-2010 to GDP and
the income stabilization coe¢ cient for the proportional income shock. With a cor-
relation of 0.63, one can conclude that government size is indeed a good predictor
for the amount of automatic stabilization. The picture changes, however, if stabi-
lization of aggregate household demand is considered, i.e. if we account for liquidity
constraints. The correlation declines signi￿cantly to 0.2, as shown in Figure 5.16
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Income Stabilization Coefficient Fitted values
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a).
16The respective correlations for the unemployment shock are 0.71 and 0.48.
15These simple correlations suggest that macro indicators like tax revenue to GDP
ratios are meaningful indicators for the stabilization e⁄ect of the tax and transfer
system on disposable income but can be misleading as indicators of the stabilization
e⁄ect on household demand. The reason is that the latter depends on the presence of
liquidity constraints. The income share of liquidity constrained households, however,
is negatively correlated with the size of government. In our analysis, we ￿nd a
correlation of -0.3. (see also Figure 8 in the Appendix).
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Average annual revenue to GDP, 2007-2010
Demand Stabilization Coefficient Fitted values
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a).
4.2 The role of other taxes
Another objection to our results could be that we neglect some taxes which are po-
tentially relevant as automatic stabilizers. These include consumption taxes like the
value added tax or sales taxes, social insurance contributions or payroll taxes paid
16by employers, corporate income taxes and other taxes like e.g. property transaction
taxes. Including some of these taxes like employer social insurance contributions
or even consumption taxes would be possible technically. But the interpretation of
these numbers would be less straightforward. Our measure of automatic stabiliza-
tion e⁄ects refers to a counterfactual without taxes. We have assumed implicitly
that market prices and wages would be the same in the absence of taxes. If we ap-
ply this to consumption taxes and employer social insurance contributions or payroll
taxes, these taxes would stabilize corporate income, as does the corporate income
tax.17 The stabilization of cash ￿ ows of corporations has implications for aggregate
demand which di⁄er substantially from the implications of stabilizing household dis-
posable income, and analyzing these implications would be beyond the scope of this
paper.18
4.3 Automatic Stabilizers and Openness
It is a striking feature of our results that automatic stabilizers di⁄er signi￿cantly
within Europe. In particular, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern Euro-
pean countries are much weaker than in the rest of Europe. One factor contributing
to this is that government size is often positively correlated with per capita incomes,
at least in Europe. The stabilization of disposable incomes will therefore be higher
in high income countries, just as a side e⁄ect of a larger public sector.
But di⁄erences in automatic stabilizers across countries may also have other rea-
sons. In particular, the e⁄ectiveness of demand stabilization as a way of stabilizing
domestic output is smaller, the more open the economy. In very open economies, do-
mestic output will depend heavily on export demand and higher demand by domestic
households will partly lead to higher imports. Clearly, openness of the economy has
a number of other implications for the tax and transfer system, including the view
that more open economies need more insurance against shocks as argued e.g. by
Rodrik (1998). Figure 6 depicts the relationship between income stabilization coe¢ -
cients and openness as measured by the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP. As
graph 6 shows, it is not the case that more open economies have weaker automatic
17Due to a lack of space, we do not discuss these results here in more detail. But given these
assumptions, the di⁄erence in the stabilization e⁄ect between the EU and the US would increase.
This is due to the fact that EU countries have on average higher consumption taxes (and social
insurance contributions) than the US states (see, e.g., European Commission (2009b) and McIntyre
et al. (2003)).
18This issue is discussed in Devereux and Fuest (forthcoming) and Buettner and Fuest (2009).
17stabilizers, the correlation is even slightly positive. For the demand stabilization
coe¢ cient, we ￿nd a similar correlation.
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, Heston et al. (2006).
4.4 Automatic stabilizers and discretionary ￿scal policy
In the debate on ￿scal policy responses to the crisis, some countries have been
criticized for being reluctant to enact ￿scal stimulus programs in order to stabilize
demand, in particular Germany. One reaction to this criticism was to point to the
fact that automatic stabilizers in Germany are more important than in other coun-
tries, so that less discretionary action is required. This raises the general question of
whether countries with weaker automatic stabilizers have taken more discretionary
￿scal policy action. To shed some light on this issue, we relate the size of ￿scal
stimulus programs to stabilization coe¢ cients.
Graph 7 shows that income stabilization coe¢ cients are largely uncorrelated to
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Income stabilization coefficient
Average annual discretionary measures 2009-2010 Fitted values
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a), IMF (2009).
the size of ￿scal stimulus programs. The same result emerges when we consider
demand stabilization coe¢ cients (see Graph 9 in the Appendix).19 This casts some
doubt on the view expressed e.g. by the IMF that countries with lower automatic
stabilizers have engaged in more discretionary ￿scal policy action (IMF (2009), p.
27).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have used the microsimulation models for the tax and transfer
systems of 19 European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM) to investi-
gate the extent to which automatic stabilizers cushion household disposable income
and household demand in the event of macroeconomic shocks. Our analysis has fo-
19We also ￿nd a similar result for the correlation between openness and ￿scal stimulus programs.
19cused on the personal income tax, employee social insurance contributions or payroll
taxes, and bene￿ts. One of the key ￿ndings of our analysis is that the amount of
automatic stabilization depends strongly on the type of income shock. In the case
of a proportional income shock, approximately 38 per cent of the shock would be
absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd a value of 32 per
cent. Within the EU, there is considerable heterogeneity, and results range from a
value of 25 per cent for Estonia to 59 per cent for Denmark. In general automatic
stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries are considerably lower than
in Continental and Northern European countries.
In the case of an unemployment shock, which a⁄ects households asymmetrically,
the di⁄erence between the EU and the US is larger. EU automatic stabilizers absorb
48 per cent of the shock whereas the stabilization e⁄ect in the US is only 34 per
cent. Again, there is considerable heterogeneity within the EU.
How does this cushioning of shocks translate into demand stabilization? Since
demand stabilization can only be achieved for liquidity constrained households, the
picture changes signi￿cantly. For the income shock, the cushioning e⁄ect of auto-
matic stabilizers is now equal to 23 per cent in the EU. For the US, we ￿nd a value
of 19 per cent, which is again rather similar. It is almost the same as the value for
the Euro area (20 per cent). For the unemployment shock, however, we ￿nd a large
di⁄erence. In the EU, the stabilization e⁄ect is equal to 32 per cent whereas the
value for the US (19 per cent) is close to the value for the income shock.
These results suggest that social transfers, in particular the rather generous sys-
tems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role for the stabilization of
disposable incomes and household demand and explain a large part of the di⁄erence
in automatic stabilizers between Europe and the US. This is con￿rmed by the de-
composition of stabilization e⁄ects in our analysis. In the case of the unemployment
shocks, bene￿ts alone absorb 19 per cent of the shock in Europe compared to just
7 per cent in the US, whereas the stabilizing e⁄ect of income taxes (taking into
account State taxes in the US as well) is similar.
Does this mean that the US economy is particularly vulnerable to the current
economic crisis? To the extent that wages are more ￿ exible than in Europe, one could
hope that fewer jobs will be lost in the crisis, so that the proportional income scenario
is more relevant. But US labor markets are also characterized by less employment
protection, so that job losses occur more quickly. For instance, between April 2008
and April 2009, the US unemployment rate increased by 3.9 percentage points while
20the unemployment rate in the Euro area only increased by less than two percentage
points. There is much less automatic stabilization of disposable incomes as well as
household consumption demand than in Europe.
A second major result from our analysis is that demand stabilization di⁄ers
considerably from disposable income stabilization. This has important policy im-
plications, also for discretionary ￿scal policy. As low income households are more
likely to be liquidity constrained and have a higher propensity of spending an in-
come increase, policies aimed at those households should lead to higher stabilizing
e⁄ects. If liquidity constraints are low, reducing tax rates in order to tackle the
crisis will not be successful in increasing aggregate demand (see also Shapiro and
Slemrod (2009)). In this case, increasing government expenditure might me a more
successful way of tackling the crisis.
A third important result of our analysis is that automatic stabilizers are very
heterogenous within Europe. Interestingly, Eastern and Southern European coun-
tries are characterized by rather low automatic stabilizers. This is surprising, at
least from an insurance point of view because lower average income (and wealth)
implies that households are more vulnerable to income shocks. One explanation
for this ￿nding could be that countries with lower per capita incomes tend to have
smaller public sectors. From this perspective, weaker automatic stabilizers in East-
ern and Southern European countries are a potentially unintended side e⁄ect of the
lower demand for government activity including redistribution. Another potential
explanation, the idea that more open economies have weaker automatic stabilizers
because domestic demand spills over to other countries, seems to be inconsistent with
the data, at least as far as the simple correlation between stabilization coe¢ cients
and trade to GDP ratios is concerned.
Finally, we have discussed the claim that countries with smaller automatic sta-
bilizers have engaged in more discretionary ￿scal policy action. According to our
results, there is no correlation between ￿scal stimulus programs of individual coun-
tries and stabilization coe¢ cients.
These results have to be interpreted in the light of various limitations of our
analysis. Firstly, the role of tax and transfer systems for stabilizing household
demand, not just disposable income, is based on strong assumptions on the link
between disposable income and household expenditures. Although we have used
what we believe to be the best available method for estimating liquidity constraints,
considerable uncertainty remains as to whether this method leads to an appropriate
21description of household behavior. Secondly, our analysis abstracts from automatic
stabilization through other taxes, in particular consumption taxes, employer social
insurance contributions and payroll taxes and corporate income taxes. Thirdly,
we have abstracted from the role of labor supply adjustments for the impact of
automatic stabilizers. We intend to pursue these issues in future research.
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25A Appendix:
A.1 Additional results
Table 2: Decomposition income scenario
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN TaxSicBen VAT TSBVAT
AT 0.294 0.000 0.139 0.006 0.439 0.124 0.564
BE 0.382 0.000 0.131 0.014 0.527 0.101 0.628
DK 0.455 0.000 0.086 0.018 0.558 0.148 0.706
EE 0.228 0.000 0.021 0.004 0.253 0.166 0.419
FI 0.340 0.000 0.050 0.006 0.396 0.170 0.566
FR 0.153 0.000 0.181 0.036 0.370 0.128 0.498
GE 0.351 0.000 0.118 0.012 0.481 0.097 0.577
GR 0.203 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.291 0.110 0.401
HU 0.307 0.000 0.160 0.009 0.476 0.138 0.614
IR 0.310 0.000 0.039 0.014 0.363 0.152 0.515
IT 0.254 0.000 0.079 0.013 0.346 0.113 0.459
LU 0.265 0.000 0.097 0.012 0.374 0.150 0.524
NL 0.270 0.000 0.116 0.011 0.397 0.146 0.543
PL 0.168 0.000 0.118 0.015 0.301 0.136 0.437
PT 0.203 0.000 0.090 0.010 0.303 0.138 0.441
SI 0.289 0.000 0.031 0.028 0.317 0.161 0.478
SP 0.240 0.000 0.035 0.001 0.277 0.114 0.391
SW 0.368 0.000 0.040 0.012 0.420 0.154 0.574
UK 0.267 0.000 0.054 0.031 0.352 0.124 0.477
EU 0.260 0.000 0.100 0.017 0.378 0.121 0.498
EURO 0.263 0.000 0.108 0.015 0.385 0.116 0.501
USA 0.240 0.049 0.039 -0.006 0.322 0.033 0.355
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
26Table 3: Decomposition unemployment scenario
FEDTax StateTax SIC BEN TaxSicBen VAT TSBVAT
AT 0.200 0.000 0.167 0.303 0.670 0.073 0.743
BE 0.257 0.000 0.124 0.276 0.657 0.073 0.730
DK 0.243 0.000 0.083 0.382 0.707 0.098 0.805
EE 0.178 0.000 0.022 -0.032 0.168 0.185 0.353
FI 0.224 0.000 0.050 0.267 0.541 0.129 0.670
FR 0.076 0.000 0.190 0.317 0.582 0.085 0.667
GE 0.231 0.000 0.145 0.268 0.645 0.066 0.711
GR 0.126 0.000 0.137 0.119 0.383 0.096 0.479
HU 0.227 0.000 0.190 0.047 0.464 0.142 0.605
IR 0.207 0.000 0.036 0.182 0.425 0.137 0.563
IT 0.183 0.000 0.101 0.076 0.359 0.111 0.470
LU 0.147 0.000 0.090 0.296 0.533 0.112 0.644
NL 0.103 0.000 0.131 0.239 0.472 0.128 0.600
PL 0.151 0.000 0.170 -0.027 0.295 0.138 0.432
PT 0.225 0.000 0.094 0.306 0.625 0.074 0.699
SI 0.175 0.000 0.216 0.054 0.425 0.136 0.561
SP 0.127 0.000 0.064 0.091 0.283 0.113 0.396
SW 0.197 0.000 0.029 0.458 0.685 0.084 0.769
UK 0.194 0.000 0.061 0.186 0.441 0.107 0.548
EU 0.172 0.000 0.121 0.189 0.482 0.100 0.581
EURO 0.166 0.000 0.129 0.210 0.504 0.092 0.597
USA 0.174 0.041 0.051 0.071 0.337 0.032 0.370
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM
27Table 4: Stabilization of aggregate demand
Share liquidity constrained Income shock Unemployment shock
Population Income ￿ Demand ￿ Income ￿ Demand ￿ Income
AT 0.750 0.408 0.172 0.439 0.396 0.670
BE 0.750 0.352 0.190 0.527 0.368 0.657
DK 0.750 0.387 0.205 0.558 0.392 0.707
EE 0.750 0.350 0.087 0.253 0.073 0.168
FI 0.750 0.364 0.136 0.396 0.314 0.541
FR 0.750 0.379 0.143 0.370 0.383 0.582
GE 0.750 0.374 0.172 0.481 0.366 0.645
GR 0.750 0.355 0.066 0.291 0.156 0.383
HU 0.750 0.322 0.120 0.476 0.151 0.464
IR 0.750 0.409 0.130 0.363 0.260 0.425
IT 0.750 0.372 0.116 0.346 0.139 0.359
LU 0.750 0.413 0.131 0.374 0.345 0.533
NL 0.750 0.467 0.168 0.397 0.283 0.472
PL 0.750 0.328 0.099 0.301 0.093 0.295
PT 0.750 0.371 0.083 0.303 0.216 0.625
SI 0.750 0.355 0.077 0.317 0.154 0.425
SP 0.750 0.408 0.091 0.277 0.147 0.283
SW 0.750 0.400 0.162 0.420 0.456 0.685
UK 0.750 0.388 0.133 0.352 0.260 0.441
EU 0.750 0.378 0.133 0.378 0.260 0.482
EURO 0.750 0.384 0.136 0.385 0.277 0.504
USA 0.750 0.310 0.089 0.322 0.128 0.337
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM. Note: Bottom 75% of
gross income distribution are assumed to be liquidity constrained.
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM, European Commission
(2009a).
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30A.2 Reweighting procedure for increasing unemployment
In order to increase the unemployment rate while keeping the aggregate counts of
other key individual and household characteristics constant, we follow the approach
taken by Immvervoll et al. (2006). The increase of the unemployment rates is mod-
eled through reweighting of our samples while controlling for several individual and
household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unemployed.
We follow Immvervoll et al. (2006) and de￿ne the unemployed as people aged
19￿ 59 declaring themselves to be out of work and looking for a job. The within-
database national ￿ unemployment rate￿is calculated as the ratio of these unemployed
to those in the labor force, de￿ned as the unemployed plus people aged 19￿ 59 who
are (self)employed. The increased total number of unemployed people is calculated
by adding 5 percentage points to the ￿ unemployment rate￿within each country.
In EUROMOD, the baseline household weights supplied with the national data-
bases have been calculated to adjust for sample design and/or di⁄erential non-
response (see Sutherland (2001) for details). Weights are then recalculated using the
existing weights as a starting point, but (a) using the increased (decreased) num-
ber of unemployed (employed) people as the control totals for them, and (b) also
controlling for demographic and household composition variables using the existing
grossed-up totals for these categories as control totals. The speci￿c variables used
as controls are:
￿ employment status





This method implies that the households without any unemployed people that
are similar to households with unemployed people (according to the above variables)
will have their weights reduced. In other words, these are the households who are
￿ made unemployed￿in our exercise.
31